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INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY FOR
KRISHNA CONSCIOUSNESS, INC. v.
LEE: PUBLIC FORUM ANALYSIS OF
AIRPORT RESTRICTIONS ON
SPEECH
It is hoped that the government authorities will cooperate
... enabling us to perform sankirana [chanting] on the
streets. To do this it is necessary that we be able to chant ...
dance, play ... the drum, request donations, [and] sell our
society's journal. As devotees of Lord Krsna, it is our duty to
teach the people how to love God and worship him in their
daily life. This is the aim and destination of human life.1
The practice of sankirtan, chanting and soliciting donations in
public places, is a basic belief of the International Society of
Krishna Consciousness which followers are required to observe.2
But should limitations exist as to where this ritual may be prac-
ticed? In the interest of democracy,' the first amendment' re-
' LARRY D SHINN, THE DARK LORD, CULT IMAGES AND THE HARE KRISHNAS IN AMERICA 81
(1987) (quoting THE KRSNA CONSCIOUSNESS HANDBOOK: FOR THE YEAR 484, CAITANYA ERA
108-09 (March 24, 1977 - March 12, 1971)).
' See id.
3 See Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949) ("it is only through free debate and
free exchange of ideas that government remains responsive to the will of the people
...."); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945) (freedom of speech is "indispensable
democratic freedom[ ]"); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 270 (1941) ("it is a prized
American privilege to speak one's mind"); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630
(1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade
in ideas ... [and] the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in
the competition of the market .... ); Rosen v. Port of Portland, 641 F.2d 1243, 1250 (9th
Cir. 1981) (first amendment rights are heart of democratic government). See generally L.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-1, at 788 (2d ed. 1988) ("freedom of speech is
. ..central to the workings of a tolerably responsive and responsible democracy .... ");
Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877, 955 (1963)
(conditions in modern democratic society demand deliberate, affirmative, and even aggres-
sive effort be made to support free expression).
Some theorists "defend free speech as crucial to the polity in a representative system
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quires that the right to free public expression be zealously safe-
guarded.' However, citizens cannot express themselves whenever
. .. TRIBE, supra, at 787 ("political participation is valuable .. .because it enhances
personal growth and self realization") (citing J.S. MILL, CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE
GOVERNMENT 203 (1882)).
Free expression "(1) assur[es] individual self-fulfillment, (2) [ius a means of attaining the
truth, (3) [i]s a method of securing participation by the members of society in social, includ-
ing political decision-making, and (4) ...maintain[s] the balance between stability and
change in the society." Emerson, supra, at 878-79.
See U.S. CONST. amend. I. The first amendment provides: "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridg-
ing the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assem-
ble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." Id.
The general purpose of the first amendment is to protect free speech by inviting debates
and exchanges of ideas. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 408 (1989) (right of free
speech invites dispute); Board of Educ., Island Trees Union Free School Dist. No. 26 v.
Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 867 (1982) (first amendment protects right to recover information and
ideas); Smith v. Arkansas State Highway Employees, Local 1315, 441 U.S. 463, 464 (1979)
(first amendment protects free speech, right to advocate ideas, associate with others, and
petition government for redress); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390
(1969) (first amendment preserves "uninhibited marketplace of ideas"); Muir v. Alabama
Educ. Television Comm'n, 688 F.2d 1033, 1037-38 (5th Cir. 1982) (first amendment pro-
hibits governmental restrictions on flow of information and ideas), cert. denied, 460 U.S.
1023 (1983); Grass Roots Organizing Workshop v. Campbell, 704 F. Supp. 644, 647
(D.S.C. 1988) (first amendment protects individual's right to advocate ideas).
I See Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 843 (1976) (any significant restriction of first amend-
ment freedoms carries heavy burden of justification); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S.
105, 115 (1943) (freedom of press, freedom of speech, freedom of religion are in preferred
position.); United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (may be
narrower operative scope for presumption of constitutionality when legislation facially ap-
pears to be within specific prohibition of Constitution, such as first ten amendments). But
see Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 90 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (preferred posi-
tion of freedom of speech is mischievous phrase if it carries thought that any law touching
communication is infected with presumptive invalidity). See generally McKay, The Preference
for Freedom, 34 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1182, 1184 (1959) (freedoms embodied in first amendment.
hold preferred position).
The United States Supreme Court has not espoused an absolutist view of the first amend-
ment, but has engaged in a balancing of interests to determine whether there has been an
infringement upon free speech. See Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36, 50-
51 (1961) (determining constitutionality of regulation involves weighing of governmental
interest involved). See generally Farber & Nowack, Justice Harlan and the First Amendment, 2
CONST. COMMENTARY 425 (1985). But see Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 610 (1969)
(Black, J., dissenting) (declines to balance away first amendment mandate that speech not
be abridged in any fashion whatsoever).
More often than not, a regulation infringing upon an individual's right to free speech
will be upheld if the government can show a compelling state interest exists and that the
restriction is no greater than that which is essential to further that interest. See Sable
Comm. of California, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989) (government may regulate
content of constitutionally protected speech only to promote compelling interest, provided
it uses least restrictive means to achieve it); Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 611
(1985) (government regulation justified when substantial governmental interest exists and
when restriction is no greater than necessary to further that interest) (quoting United
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States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968)); United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177
(1983) (to prohibit particular type of expression government most prove compelling state
interest and that restriction is narrowly drawn to achieve that end); Felix v. Rolan, 833
F.2d 517, 519 (5th Cir. 1987) (restrictions on first amendment rights are constitutional
only if no greater than necessary to further substantial state interests); Gibson v. Florida
Bar, 798 F.2d 1564, 1569 (11 th Cir. 1986) (two-part test applied to all first amendment
challenges: compelling interest and least restrictive means of achieving that interest). Cer-
tain basic principles factor into the weighing process, as, for example, the requirement that
permissible regulations not be overbroad so as to infringe upon protected activity. See
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304 (1940) (state's "power to regulate must be so
exercised as not, in attaining a permissible end, unduly to infringe the 'protected free-
dom"). However, the Court has been Iess willing to invoke the overbreadth doctrine. See
Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARv. L. REV. 844, 918 (1970) (sug-
gesting statute should be struck down only where substantially overbroad to avoid inhibi-
tory impact).
Governmental restrictions on free speech are imposed in two ways: 1) restrictions based
on content, either because of the ideas and information expressed, or because of the gen-
eral subject matter or, 2) the government seeks to avoid an evil unrelated to the content of
the regulation of which incidentally interferes with speech. "The first form of abridgement
. . . encompass[es] government actions aimed at communicative impact; the second . . .
encompass[es] government actions aimed at noncommunicative impact but nonetheless
having adverse communicative opportunity." Id. (citing Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study
in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REV.
1482 (1975)); see Nimmer, The Meaning of Symbolic Speech Under the First Amendment, 21
U.C.L.A. L. REV. 29 (1973); Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of Expression, 1 PHIL. & PuB. AFF.
204 (1972).
For cases applying these two types of restrictions, see Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 750-52 (1.976) (prohibition against
advertising prescription drug prices); Kovacs, 336 U.S. at 85 (examining ordinance which
bars vehicles, emitting loud and raucous noises, from public streets); Martin v. Struthers,
319 U.S. 141, 143-44 (1943) (discussing ordinance preventing distribution of leaflets re-
gardless of content); Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919) (examining statute making
it unlawful to obstruct recruiting and enlistment service of United States).
Courts restrict governmental intrusion on first amendment rights by denying attempts to
impose regulations on free speech. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 397 (1989)
(struck down Texas prohibition against burning American flag); Metromedia, Inc. v. City
of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 512-13 (1981) (struck down ordinance prohibiting billboards
containing noncommercial messages); Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 701-
02 (1977) (invalidated prohibition against advertising or display of contraceptives); Cohen
v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 16, 22-26 (1971) (struck down states right to ban offensive lan-
guage on jacket back); Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218-20 (1966) (invalidated prohibi-
tion against discussing political candidate on last day of election); Lovell v City of Griffin,
303 U.S. 444, 450-53 (1938) (holding unconstitutional an ordinance forbidding distribu-
tion of literature without permit). But see, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781,
797-802 (1989) (upheld requirement that rock performers use only city provided sound
equipment); Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640,
643-45, 655-56 (1981) (upheld regulation requiring anyone soliciting funds at state fair do
so only from assigned booth); Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 304 (1974)
(upheld city's right to reject political advertising on buses); Kovacs, 336 U.S. at 89 (upheld
ban on use of amplification devices emitting loud noise in public places); Gitlow v. New
York, 268 U.S. 652, 654-55, 672 (1925) (upheld statute banning overthrow of govern-
ment); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52-53 (1919) (upheld statute prohibiting
mailing of circulars that obstructed draft).
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and wherever they choose'- reasonable time, place and manner
restrictions may be imposed.' In determining the constitutionality
' See Carey, 431 U.S. at 716 (Stevens, J., concurring) (speech not wholly immune from
state regulation); Eldrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 360 (1976) (no absolute prohibition on
encroachment of first amendment protections); Cohen, 403 U.S. at 19 (first amendment
does not "give absolute protection to every individual to speak whenever or wherever he
pleases, or to use any form of address in any circumstances that he chooses"); Cox v. Loui-
siana, 379 U.S 536, 554 (1965) (rights of free speech are not without limitations). See also
B. SCHWARTZ, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 8.1 (2d ed. 1979) (exercise of first amendment free-
doms "must be compatible with the preservation of other essential rights"); Emerson, supra
note 3, at 907 (any theory of freedom of expression must account for other values, such as
public order, justice, equality and moral progress).
When a communication presents a clear and present danger to society, abridgement of
the freedom of expression is justifiable. See Schenck, 249'U.S. at 52.
The most stringent protection of free speech would not protect a man in falsely
shouting fire in a theater .... The question in every case is whether the words used
are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and
present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a
right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree.
Id.; see also Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 628 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting)
(government may restrict speech where there is present danger of immediate evil or intent
to bring it about).
The Supreme Court has set forth the standard for determining the constitutionality of
statutes which prohibit the advocacy of the use of force or of law violation. See Hess v.
Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 108 (1973). The government may prohibit such speech where such
advocacy is intended to incite or produce imminent lawless action and is likely to result in
such action. Id. (emphasis in original) (citing Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447
(1969)). See generally Gunther, Learned Hand and the Origins of Modern First Amendment Doc-
trine: Some Fragments of History, 27 STAN. L. REV. 719 (1975) (discussion of Justice Learned
Hand's position on free speech); Redish, Advocacy of Unlawful Conduct and the First Amend-
ment: In Defense of Clear and Present Danger, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 1159 (1982).
The right of the government to regulate speech is also greater when the speech is char-
acterized as obscene. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23-24 (1973) (current status of
obscenity in constitutional framework); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957)
(obscenity not constitutionally protected speech); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S.
568, 571-72 (1942) (regulation of lewd and obscene speech has not posed constitutional
problem). See generally Lockhart & McClure, Obscenity Censorship: The Core Constitutional
Issue - What is Obscene?, 7 UTAH L. REV. 289 (1961) (discussing constitutional develop-
ments in law relating to censorship of obscenity); Lockhart & McClure, Censorship of Obscen-
ity: Developing Constitutional Standards, 45 MINN. L. REV. 5 (1960) (defining obscenity and
examining censorship of it).
See Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984). The
Clark Court stressed that expression, in any form, is subject to reasonable time, place and
manner restrictions. Id. As such, that Court upheld an ordinance that limited the manner
in which a demonstration could be carried out in a public park. Id. at 294. Specifically, the
ordinance prohibited camping on park lands. Id. The Court upheld the ordinance since
there were established areas for camping, the ordinance was content-neutral and was nar-
rowly tailored to achieve the government's substantial interest in maintaining the parks for
public enjoyment. Id. at 295-96.
The terms "time" and "place" are unambiguous. See Lee, Lonely Pamphleteers, Little Peo-
ple and the Supreme Court: The Doctrine of Time, Place, and Manner Regulations of Expression,
54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 757, 757 n.2 (1986). The term "manner," however, may refer to
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of these restrictions, the type of forum in which the speech occurs
must be classified as either public or nonpublic.' If the forum is
classified as public, time, place and manner restrictions on speech
will be upheld, provided they are content-neutral, narrowly tai-
the medium or method of communication, the communicator's behavior, the physical at-
tributes of the medium, or the use of particular words or symbols as a means of expression.
Id. (citations omitted). Cf Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 136 (1966) (sit-in used to
protest constitutional violations).
I See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 800-01
(1985) (court must identify nature of forum that speech was presented in to determine
level of government-imposed access limitations).
As early as 1897, the Supreme Court addressed the public forum issue in Davis v. Massa-
chusetts, where it upheld an ordinance that forbade public address on public property with-
out a permit. 167 U.S. 43, 48 (1897). In 1939 the Court addressed the public forum issue
again, distinguishing the Davis restriction on free speech. See Hague v. Committee for In-
dus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515-16 (1939). The Hague Court stated that:
[wiherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially been held
in trust for the use of the public and .... have been used for purposes of assembly,
communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions. Such use
of the streets and public places has, from ancient times, been a part of the privileges,
immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens.
Id. at 515. Although this often-cited statement is dictum, it has played a major role in the
evolution of public forum theory, and "has come to be the cornerstone of the public forum
doctrine." Note, Public Forum Analysis After Perry Education Association v. Perry Local
Educators' Ass'n - A Conceptual Approach to Claims of First Amendment Access to Publicly
Owned Property, 54 FORDHAm L. REV. 545, 547 n. 17 (1986) [hereinafter Public Forum Analy-
sis After Perry]. See generally Kalven The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965
Sup. CTr. REV. 1 (1965) (in-depth discussion of term "public forum"); Stone, Fora Americana:
Speech in Publii Places, 1974 Sup. CT. REV. 233 (general discussion and history of public
forum doctrine). In 1983, the Court decided Perry Education Association v. Perry Local Edu-
cators' Association, classifying a forum into one of three categories: traditional public, desig-
nated public, nonpublic. 460 U.S. 37, 45-46 (1983). The method of analysis delineated in
Perry, although frequently utilized, has been criticized for not enumerating characteristics
inherent to traditional public forums. See Public Forum Analysis After Perry, supra, at 551-54.
Additionally, there is a growing amount of criticism of the utilization of public/nonpublic
forum analysis, as it can be confusing and manipulative. See, e.g., TRIBE, supra note 3, §12-
24 at 992-96 (whether place is public forum is less important than restriction placed on
speech); Dienes, The Trashing of the Public Forum; Problems in First Amendment Analysis, 55
GEO. WASH. L. REV. '109, 122 (1986) (noting deficiencies in public/nonpublic analysis); Far-
ber & Nowack, supra note 5, at 1234 (classification of public places as various types of
forums has confused judicial opinions); see also Post, Between Governance and Management:
The History and Theory of the Public Forum, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1713, 1764 (1987) (public
forum doctrine is blank check for government control of public access to nonpublic forum
for communicative purposes); Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 46, 93
(1987) (distinction between public and nonpublic forums is artificial); Note, Forum over Sub-
stance: Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Education Fund, 35 CATH. UL. REV. 307, 310
(1985) (Perry distinction misleading if used to analyze since it implies that government may
restrict expression in some places simply because it intends to restrict expression in those
places); Comment, Board of Airport Commissioners v. Jews for Jesus, Inc.: A Missed Oppor-
tunity to Restore Fundamental Fairness to Public Forum Analysis, 8 PACE L. REv. 607, 607-08
(1988) (public/nonpublic forum distinction inherently unfair).
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lored to serve a significant governmental interest and leave open
alternative channels of communication. 9 Courts generally apply
this standard when considering the constitutionality of regulations
that restrict freedom of expression in public airports.10 Recently,
however, in International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v.
Lee," the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit applied a less
demanding standard and upheld an airport regulation which pro-
hibited the solicitation of funds in the airport, finding that the
terminals are nonpublic forums.12
The International Society for Krishna Consciousness ("ISK-
See Grace, 461 U.S. at 177; O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377. In O'Brien, the Court stated:
[g]overnment regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power
of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest;
if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if
the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is
essential to the furtherance of that interest.
Id.
The requirement that time, place and manner restrictions on speech be narrowly tai-
lored does not mandate that the government use the least restrictive means to achieve its
purpose. See Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. at 782-83. "[T]he requirement of narrow tailor-
ing is satisfied 'so long as the ...regulation promotes a substantial government interest
that would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation,' . . . and the means chosen are
not substantially broader than necessary to achieve [that interest]" Id. (quoting United
States v. Abertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689 (1985)); see also Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641,
657 (1984) (less-restrictive-alternative analysis inapplicable to inquiry into validity of time,
place and manner regulation). But see Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 485 (1988) (complete
ban can be narrowly tailored, but only if each activity within proscription's scope is appro-
priately targeted evil).
10 See, e.g., Jamison v. City of St. Louis, 828 F.2d 1280, 1282-84 (8th Cir. 1987) (airports
character and pattern of activity similar to city street makes it appropriate place for com-
munication of views), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 987 (1988); Jews for Jesus, Inc. v. Board of
Airport Comm'rs, 785 F.2d 791, 794-95 (9th Cir. 1986) (followed prior opinions holding
airports to be traditional public forums), affd on other grounds, 482 U.S. 569, 572 (1987);
Fernandes v. Limmer, 663 F.2d 619, 626-27 (5th Cir. 1981) (constant traffic flow in termi-
nals not compelling enough reason to justify exclusion of speakers), cert. dismissed, 458 U.S.
1124 (1982); Rosen v. Port of Portland, 641 F.2d 1243, 1250 (9th Cir. 1981) (prior regis-
tration requirement unconstitutional); Chicago Area Military Project v. City of Chicago,
508 F.2d 921, 926 (7th Cir.) (regulation of public places must be narrowly drawn to pro-
tect government interest with least possible limitations placed on free speech), cert. denied,
421 U.S. 992 (1975); Kuszynski v. City of Oakland, 479 F.2d 1130, 1131 (9th Cir. 1973)
(regulations on free speech in public airports must be narrowly drawn to serve legitimate
public interests); Interhational Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Wolke, 453 F.
Supp. 869, 872-74 (E.D. Wis. 1978) (concluding that terminal building at General Mitchell
Field is public forum). See also Comment, First Amendment Protection of Free Speech in Public
Airports, 55 J. AIR L. & CoM. 1075, 1080 (1990) (majority of federal courts addressing this
issue have determined that municipal airports are public forums).
:1 925 F.2d 576 (2d Cir. 1991).
12 See id. at 580-82.
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CON") is a non-profit religious organization. 13 One of ISKCON's
rituals is sankirtan, whereby members are required to go to public
places, hand out religious literature and solicit funds to support
the organization. 4 Performance of sankirtan lies at the theologi-
cal heart of ISKCON's religion and is a central duty of its faith. 5
In ISKCON v. Lee, ISKCON challenged a regulation, promul-
gated by the Port Authority, 6 which prohibited the solicitation of
money and the distribution of literature in three New York met-
ropolitan area airports, thereby restricting ISKCON members
from performing sankirtan.' ISKCON moved for summary judg-
ment, arguing that the Port Authority regulation unconstitution-
ally restricted group members from exercising their first amend-
" See id. at 577. This international group follows the views of Krishna Consciousness, a
branch of Hinduism. See International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Barber, 650
F.2d 430, 433 (2d Cir. 1981). The American Krishna Consciousness movement members
are purportedly instructed to spread the teachings of their religion to the "spiritually im-
pure." Id. at 434. Members "can best serve their spiritual masters if they conduct them-
selves as ideal persons, spreading the religion's teachings by example." Id. United States v.
Silberman, 464 F. Supp. 866, 870 (M.D. Fla. 1979). Members of the movement "surrender
their material possessions, change their diet, lifestyle and appearance, and devote them-
selves to service of their Lord."
'" See ISKCON v. Lee, 925 F.2d at 577. The sankirtan ritual has three purposes: "(1) to
spread the religious information which the Hare Krishna religion deems to be truth; (2) to
proselytize and attract new members; and (3) to generate funds to support the religious
activities of the movement." Silberman, 464 F. Supp. at 870.
15 See Barber, 650 F.2d at 433 (citing People v. Woody, 61 Cal.2d 716, 394 P.2d 813,
818, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69, 74 (1964)). Although not all members perform sankirtan, it is con-
sidered central to the religion. See id. In fact, donations and book sales are the principle
means of support of the religious movement. See International Soc'y for Krishna Con-
sciousness v. Engelhardt, 425 F. Supp. 176, 178 n.2 (W.D. Mo. 1977) (citing Plaintiff's
Affidavit).
"' See ISKCON v. Lee, 925 F.2d at 578-79. The Port Authority, an interstate agency of
New York and New Jersey, operates the three New York metropolitan area airports-John
F. Kennedy, LaGuardia, and Newark International Airports. See id. at 578. Although much
of the airport space is leased by airlines and is primarily under the airlines' control, the
unleased portions of the airports, such as the International Arrivals Building at Kennedy,
are within the control of the Port Authority. See id.
" See id. at 578-79. The Port Authority regulation reads in pertinent part:
1. The following conduct is prohibited within the interior areas of buildings or
structures at an air terminal if conducted by a person to or with passers-by in a
continuous or repetitive manner:
(a) The sale or distribution of any merchandise, including but not limited to, jew-
elry, food stuffs, candles, flowers, badges and clothing.
(b) The sale or distribution of flyers, brochures, pamphlets, books or any other
printed or written material.
(c) The solicitation and receipt of funds.
Id.
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ment right to free speech in airports."8 The United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York struck down the
Port Authority regulation and granted ISKCON's motion for
summary judgment, holding that "the airports' character, pattern
of activity, and nature of purpose . . . place them squarely within
the public forum family," thus making them appropriate places
for first amendment activity.19
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, affirming in part and reversing in part,20 concluded that
airport terminals are nonpublic forums and, therefore, upheld the
Port Authority's ban on solicitation for funds.21 Writing for the
majority, Judge Winter stated that reversal was dictated by the re-
cent Supreme Court decision, United States v. Kokinda.22 In
Kokinda,23 a plurality of the Court held that a sidewalk outside a
post office, which was not connected to a public street, was a non-
public forum. 24 The Court reasoned that the sidewalk served
merely as a conduit between the post office and parking lot,2 5 and
"8 See International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 721 F. Supp. 572, 573
(S.D.N.Y. 1989), affd in part, rev'd in part, 925 F.2d 576 (2d Cir. 1991).
Although the regulations do not appear to restrict performance of sankirtan in the exte-
rior portions of the airports, ISKCON has "consistently limited their demands for access to
the interior of the terminal buildings only." Id. at 573-74. In addition, "[p]laintiffs do not
seek to perform sankirtan in any private offices, ticket counters and lines, check-in areas,
[or] baggage claim areas . Id. at 578 n.9.
11 Id. at 579.
Initially, plaintiffs sought access to both airline and port authority controlled property,
but had named only the Port Authority and its police superintendent Lee as defendants.
See id. at 573. Lee, now deceased, was responsible for enforcing the regulation. ISKCON,
925 F.2d at 577. Since the district court found the airline to be an indispensable party to
the litigation, it denied plaintiffs motion for preliminary injunctive relief. See ISKCON, 721
F. Supp. at 573. Plaintiffls amended their complaint to include several of the airlines as
defendants. See id. The airlines moved for summary judgment, arguing that their prohibi-
tions did not constitute state action. See id. The district court denied the airline's motion
for summary judgment and certified the state action question to the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit. See id. The Second Circuit remanded the case for "further discovery
and development of the evidentiary record." d. After a settlement agreement with the
airlines, the Port Authority police superintendant remained the sole defendant. See Id. The
Port Authority had been dismissed as a defendant in 1977. See id.
20 See ISKCON v. Lee, 925 F.2d at 582.
s' See id. The court draws the distinction between the distribution of literature and solic-
itation for funds, holding that the latter is a greater inconvenience. See id.
22 See id.
" United States v. Kokinda, 110 S. Ct. 3115 (1990).




that solicitation interfered with this purpose."
Drawing analogy to the Kokinda decision, the court in ISKCON
v. Lee, reasoned that in-person solicitation in airports interfered
with the intended functioning of the air terminals by inconve-
niencing passengers in already congested terminals, "7 just as solici-
tation at the post office in Kokinda disrupted postal service busi-
ness. 8 Furthermore, the court noted that since airports are
funded by user-fees and are operated to make a regulated profit,
the Port Authority has an interest in protecting users from in-per-
son solicitations, 9 which have the potential "for evoking highly
personal and subjective reactions" likely to cause people to avoid
the facilities." The court concluded that virtually everyone who
enters the terminal does so in connection with air-travel and not
for a purpose related to protected expression.3" Finally, the court
distinguished solicitation of funds from distribution of literature
and ordered the Port Authority to provide reasonable access to
the terminals for such distribution. 2
Writing for the dissent, Chief Judge Oakes argued that Kokinda
was misapplied by the majority since it did not "announce[] a new
rule that changes a forum's purpose from being an important fac-
tor in public forum analysis to being the sole determinant of a
forum's status."3 3 The dissent asserted that "purpose analysis"
alone cannot dictate a forum's status, 4 but rather, it is essential to
balance the "purposes of the forum . . . the tradition of public
access to that forum, and the interests of those who wish to use
the forum for another purpose . . . . -" The dissent was not per-
suaded by the Port Authority's arguments that the terminals dif-
16 See id. at 3123.
27 See ISKCON v. Lee, 925 F.2d at 581-82. The court distinguished the airport terminals
from downtown streets (traditional public forums) by noting that persons in the airport are
not engaged in the purposes for which downtown streets are used. See id.
28 See id. at 581. See also Kokinda, 110 S. Ct. at 3123. ("Soliciting ... has as its objective
an immediate act of charity" requiring postal patrons to stop, block the flow of traffic, and
decide whether or not to contribute).
2 See ISKCON v. Lee, 925 F.2d at 581.
a Kokinda, 110 S. Ct. at 3123-24.
s' See ISKCON v. Lee, 925 F.2d at 578.
31 See id. at 582.
33 Id. at 584 (Oakes, C.J., dissenting).
:4 See id. at 582-83.
8 Id. at 584.
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fer from the traditional public forum because of their design, us-
age, congestion, security problems, user-fee financing and captive
audiences,36 concluding that the airport terminals resemble and
function as public streets and thoroughfares and, therefore,
should be categorized as public forums. 7
Part I of this Comment will examine the different standards of
review applicable to restrictions on speech in public and nonpublic
forums. Part II will analyze two methods of determining forum
status: physical characteristic analysis and purpose analysis. Part
III will suggest that the court's reliance upon the Kokinda decision
in ISKCON v. Lee was inappropriate. Finally, Part IV will assert
that the court's designation of the airport terminals as nonpublic
forums in ISKCON v. Lee was unnecessary because the airport reg-
ulation is capable of withstanding the more demanding level of
scrutiny applicable to time, place and manner restrictions on
speech in public forums.
I. THE STANDARDS OF REVIEW APPLIED TO RESTRICTIONS ON
SPEECH IN PUBLIC AND NONPUBLIC FORUMS
Necessity and convenience often prompt the enactment of re-
strictions on the time, place and manner of speech." To be consti-
tutionally sound, these regulations must operate without reference
" See ISKCON v. Lee, 925 F.2d at 585.
" See id. at 585-86.
" See, e.g., United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 687 (1985) (protection of military
property); Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 656 (1984) (prevention of counterfeiting);
Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984) (protection of
national park); Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S.
640, 648 (1981) (maintenance of orderliness at state fair grounds); FCC v. Pacifica Found.,
438 U.S. 726, 749 (1978) (protection of well-being of children); Cameron v. Johnson, 390
U.S. 611, 616-17 (1968) (prevention of obstruction to courthouse entrance from picket-
ing); Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 644-45 (1951) (protection of privacy of citizens);
Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 89 (1949) (prevention of noise pollution); Cox v. New
Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 576 (1941) (maintenance of order at parade). See also Note, The
Search for Valid Governmental Regulations: A Review of the Judicial Response to Municipal Poli-
cies Regarding First Amendment Activities, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 561, 570-71 (1988) Dis-
cussing various governmental interests served by restrictions on speech, one commentator
notes that "in light of the numerous decisions in the first amendment area and the com-
plexity of the Supreme Court's analysis, a government official's ad hoc determination of
the reasonableness of a specific regulation is grossly inadequate." Id. at 572. Therefore, it
is said, "officials should select policies affecting first amendment rights conservatively, keep-
ing in mind the complexity and unpredictability of the judicial process." Id.
342
Vol. 6: 333, 1991
Public Forum Analysis
to the content of the speech." Once a court determines that a
time, place and manner regulation is content-neutral, it applies
the appropriate standard of review for determining the regula-
tion's propriety.' 0 The level of scrutiny applicable to the regula-
tion is dependent upon the nature of the forum in which the
speech is restricted.4 A forum may be characterized as a tradi-
tional public forum, a designated public forum or a nonpublic
forum. 4
Traditional public forums, such as parks and streets, are those
properties that have long been regarded as the most suitable
channels for public communication. 43 Designated public forums
are areas that the government has voluntarily opened to the pub-
lic as appropriate for first amendment expression." Nonpublic fo-
3' See NOWAK, ROTUNDA & YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16.47(a) (3d ed. 1986). If
time, place and manner restrictions on speech did not have to be content-neutral, "the
state would be able to cloak restrictions on speech itself in the guise of regulations of the
mode of speech or the place - the streets, the parks, public buildings - which is used for
the speech." Id. Content-based regulations which limit expression based on the particular
message conveyed, however, have been upheld. See, e.g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S.
747, 763 (1982) (ban on child pornography); Gertz v. Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340
(1974) (prohibition against false statements of fact); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 18-19
(1973) (ban on obscenity); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 545 (1951) (prohibition
of advocating violent overthrow of government); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S.
568, 572 (1942) (ban on fighting words). See generally Stone, Restrictions of Speech Because of
its Content: The Peculiar Case of Subject Matter Restrictions, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 81, 100-07
(1978) (discussing special dangers of content-based restrictions); Note, The Content Distinc-
tion in Free Speech Analysis After Renton, 102 HARv. L. REV. 1904, 1913-17 (1989) (sug-
gesting that content-neutral/content-based distinction is made to prevent discrimination
against particular viewpoints).
40 See Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. Cm. L. REv. 46, 48-50 (1987) (identifying
"at least seven seemingly distinct standards of review").
11 See Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45-46 (1983) (set-
ting forth three distinct standards of review for each type of forum).
42 See id.; see also The Supreme Court - Leading Cases, 99 HARv. L. REV. 120, 207-09
(1985) (discussing Supreme Court's redefinition of categories of forum).
3 See Hague v. Committee for Indust. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939). The designation
of an area as a traditional public forum "guarantees that speakers will have access to such
sites without burdensome restrictions." Goldberger, A Reconsideration of Cox v. New Hamp-
shire: Can Demonstrators Be Required to Pay the Costs of Using America's Public Forums?, 62
TEx. L. REV. 403, 418 (1983). See also United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 180, 183
(1983) (invalidating prohibition against carrying signs on sidewalks surrounding court
building because "traditional public forum property occupies a special position in terms of
First Amendment protection"); Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413, 416 (1943) (voiding flat
ban on leaflet distribution because one rightfully on street has right to express views in
orderly fashion); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 165 (1939) (same).
"' See Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 45. See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267
(1981) (university created designated public forum by making facilities available for meet-
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rums, by contrast, are places which are not traditionally utilized
for expressive activity.45 The differences between the forums re-
quire the application of different standards for reviewing the con-
stitutionality of time, place and manner restrictions on speech."'
Time, place and manner restrictions on speech in traditional
public forums must be narrowly tailored to serve a significant gov-
ernmental interest and must leave open alternative channels of
communication."' Like restrictions on speech in designated public
forums, similarly, must be narrowly drawn to achieve a compelling
state interest.48 In nonpublic forums, regulations of expressive ac-
ings of registered students); City of Madison Joint School Dist. No. 8 v. Wisconsin Employ-
ment Relations Comm'n, 429 U.S. 167, 175 (1976) (designated public forum established
when state opened school board meeting for citizen involvement); Southeastern Promo-
tions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 555 (1975) (municipal theater is public forum
"designed for and dedicated to expressive activities").
" See Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 46. See, e.g., United States Postal Serv. v. Counsel of
Greenburgh Civic Ass'n, 453 U.S. 114, 128 (1981) (letterbox is not public forum); Greer v.
Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 838 (1976) (federal military reservation does not serve as place for
free expression); Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 304 (1974) (advertising
space on city's transit system is not first amendment .forum).
" See supra notes 40 and 41 (noting several standards of review). See also Cornelius v.
NAACP Legal Defense and Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985).
[T]he Court has adopted a forum analysis as a means of determining when the Gov-
ernment's interest in limiting the use of its property to its intended purpose out-
weighs the interest of those wishing to use the property for other purposes. Accord-
ingly, the extent to which the Government can control access depends on the nature
of the relevant forum.
Id.
One commentator notes that the labeling of forums as public or nonpublic to determine
the appropriate standard of review minimizes the deference to first amendment values. See
Dienes, The Trashing of the Public Forum: Problems in First Amendment Analysis, 55 GEo.
WASH. L. REV. 109, 120 (1986). "The nonpublic forum cases reflect a disposition to decide
First Amendment cases through labeling." Id.
" See Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 800; Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460
U.S. 37, 45 (1983). See, e.g., Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S.
530, 544 (1980) (ban on bill inserts that discuss controversial issues of public policy not
valid time, place'manner restriction); Linmark Assocs., Inc. v. Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 93
(1977) (prohibition of 'For Sale' signs does not leave open satisfactory alternative channels
of communication); Virginia State. Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
-Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 769-70 (1976) (governmental interest not sufficient to warrant ban on
advertising prescription drug prices). See also Horning, The First Amendment Right to a Public
Forum, 1969 DUKE L.J. 931, 937 (1969) (suggesting government's "constitutional obliga-
tion" to provide facilities for mass communication).
"' See Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 800; Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 45-46. "The Constitution
forbids a State to enforce certain exclusions from a forum generally open to the public
even if it was not required to create the forum in the first place." Id. at 45. See also Smolla,
Preserving the Bill of Rights in the Modern Administrative-Industrial State, 31 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 321, 341 (1990) (suggesting only difference between traditional and designated public
forum "is that the government has no control over the status of a traditional forum").
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tivity need only be reasonable, provided they do not substantially
interfere with communication.'
9
These varying standards of review highlight the importance of
properly designating the forum in which speech is being re-
stricted.50 Indeed, the development of a uniform approach for de-
termining whether an area is a public or nonpublic forum has
been the focus of many decisions examining the constitutionality
of time, place and manner restrictions on speech.51
II. FORUM ANALYSIS: A Two-PART TEST FOR DETERMINING
FORUM STATUS
A. Physical Characteristic Analysis
Although the physical characteristics of property alone cannot
dictate forum status, they are factors essential to forum analysis. 2
If an area is characteristically open, is a public thoroughfare and/
or is frequented by many people, the implication is that the area is
a traditional public forum.5 s Additionally, a location's physical re-
semblance to a street6 or its geographical separation is relevant in
granting or denying public forum status. 5
,0 See Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 806; Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 46. See also Dienes, supra
note 44, at 117 (suggesting reasonableness standard of review for nonpublic forums is "es-
sentially no review at all").
"o See Dienes, supra note 46, at 118. "Given the largely outcome-determinative character
of the nonpublic-forum label, the standard for assigning property to this category is of
obvious importance." Id.
" See infra notes 52-59 and accompanying text.
o See United States v. Kokinda, 110 S. Ct. 3115, 3120 (1990) (physical characteristics
alone do not dictate forum status); ISKCON v. Lee, 925 F.2d 576, 584 (2d Cir. 1991)
(Oakes, C.J., dissenting) (traditional public forum status does not depend upon any single
factor/characteristic); Wolin v. Port of New York Auth., 392 F.2d 83, 89 (2d Cir.) (factors
for determining public forum status: character of place, usual activity, essential purpose,
people who frequent forum), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 940 (1968); Public Forum Analysis After
Perry, supra note 8, at 555-62 (proposal of five characteristics used to determine forum
status: openness, public thoroughfare, populousness, private capacity, voluntariness). See
also Southeastern Promotions Ltd. v. West Palm Beach, 457 F,2d 1016, 1019 (5th Cir.
1972) (citing Wolin factors).
53 See Public Forum Analysis After Perry, supra note 8, at 555. This Note additionally sug-
gests examining whether the people present are there as private citizens and voluntarily.
See id. See also United-States Labor Party v. Knox, 430 F. Supp. 1359, 1361 (W.D.N.C.
1977) (historically solicitation common in areas frequented by many people).
" See infra note 80 (street and airport similarities).
55 See United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 179-180 (1983) (sidewalks on outer limits of
court's grounds not geographically separated from other sidewalks in Washington D.C. and
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B. Purpose Analysis
Ascertaining the purpose of a particular area has long aided the
determination of forum status.56 It is important to examine the
compatibility of the expressive activity with the nature of the area
when determining the "purpose" of a forum."7 While purpose
alone cannot dictate forum status,68 "the nature [and essential
purpose] of the forum and the conflicting interests involved have
remained important in determining the degree of protection af-
forded by the [first] Amendment to the speech in question."5 9
In United States v. Kokinda,60 two volunteers for the National
should not be treated differently when determining type of forum). See also Perry Educ.
Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 44 (1983) (restrictions of speech may
be struck down depending on nature of forum where restriction imposed); Wolin, 392 F.2d
at 89-90. In Wolin, the court identified the character of a place as one of the factors to
consider in determining whether property should be a public forum. See id. The court
stated that the character of the Port Authority terminal was clearly a thoroughfare used by
many people everyday, and that it is improper to say "that the mere presence of a roof
alters the character of the place, or makes the Terminal an inappropriate place for expres-
sion." Id. Classic examples of forums which have been rendered nonpublic because of their
location and physical characteristics are military bases and jailhouse grounds. See, e.g.,
Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 836-38 (1976) (streets through enclosed and highly re-
stricted military base are nonpublic); Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 47 (1966) (like pri-
vate owners, state may preserve jailhouse property under its control, for its intended
purpose).
" See, e.g., Perry Educ. Ass'n., 460 U.S. at 45 (designated public forums are those which
state opened for use by public for purpose of expressive activity); United States Postal Serv.
v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114, 129 (1981) (Court emphasizes pur-
pose of letterboxes, to "protect mail revenues while at the same time facilitating the secure
and efficient delivery of the mails."); Hague v. Committee for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496,
515 (1939) (streets and parks, traditional public forums, "have been used for purposes of
communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions").
" See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 273-75 (1981) (allowing religious groups access
to University's facilities would not violate University's policy of not advancing religion). See
also Z. CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 418 (1941) (although parks and streets
serve diverse purpose of traffic and recreation, they must allow some access for free
expression).
See JSKCON v. Lee, 925 F.2d at 584 (Oakes, C.J., dissenting). "[T]raditional public
forum status does not turn on any single factor or characteristic. Rather, a more complex
balancing determination is necessary .. " Id. See also supra notes 56-57 and accompanying
text (discussing characteristics used to determine forum status).
59 Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 302-03 (1973) (city bus ad space not
public forum). See Greer, 424 U.S. at 837-38 (national security purpose of military post
favors finding that Fort Dix is not public forum); Adderley, 385 U.S. at 41 (jails built for
security purposes not traditionally open to public); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S.
229, 237 (1963) (state capitol grounds open to public for protest); U.S. S.W. Africa/
Namibia Trade and Cultural Council v. United States, 708 F.2d 760, 764 (D.C. Cir. 1983)
(to appraise forum's character, court must evaluate nature of airport terminals).
60 110 S. Ct. 3115 (1990).
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Democratic Policy Committee set up a table on the sidewalk of a
Maryland post office to solicit funds and distribute political literi-
ture.6' The volunteers were convicted for violating a law that pro-
hibited solicitation on postal premises." A plurality of the Court
examined the nature of the post office sidewalk and determined
that it was not expressly dedicated to any free speech activity." In
determining that the area was not a public forum, the plurality
asserted that the purpose of the sidewalk was to provide a passage-
way for individuals using the post office"' and "not to facilitate the
daily commerce and life of the neighborhood or city."65 Because
the government had not expressly dedicated the property to first
amendment activities, the plurality concluded that the sidewalk
was a nonpublic forum whose regulation would be examined only
for reasonableness.66 It further concluded that the purpose of the
forum was to achieve efficient and effective postal delivery,67 and
because solicitation interfered with this goal, it should not be
permitted."
III. ISKCON v. LEE INCORRECTLY DESIGNATES AIRPORTS
NONPUBLIC FORUMS
Contrary to the prevailing view that airports are public fo-
rums,69 the majority in ISKCON v. Lee determined that the recent
61 See id. at 3117-18.
02 See id. at 3118.
61 See id. at 3121. (Brennan, J., Marshall, J., Stevens, J., & Blackmun, J., dissenting). The
post office provided for only one means of communication, posting public notices on bulle-
tin boards. See id.
See id. at 3120. (Brennan, J., Marshall, J., Stevens, J., & Blackmun, J., dissenting).
06 Kokinda, 110 S. Ct. at 3120. The Kokinda dissent, in contrast, dismissed this reasoning
and argued that the plurality afforded the purpose of the sidewalk too much significance,
stating that "public sidewalks, parks, and streets have been reserved for public use as fo-
rums for speech even though government has not constructed them for expressive 'Pur-
poses." Id. at 3129. (Brennan, J., Marshall, J., Stevens, J., & Blackmun, J., dissenting).
60 See id. at 3119-20. See also Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educ. Fund, Inc.,
473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985) (extent to which government can control access depends upon
nature of relevant forum).
0" See Kokinda, 110 S. Ct. at 3122. (Brennan, J., Marshall, J., Stevens, J., & Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
*8 See id. at 3123. (Brennan, J., Marshall, J., Stevens, J., & Blackmun, J., dissenting).
e' See, e.g., Jews for Jesus, Inc. v. Board of Airport Comm'rs, 785 F.2d 791, 793-95 (9th
Cir. 1986) (airports are public forums), aff'd, 492 U.S. 569 (1987); Fernandes v. Limmer,
663 F.2d 619, 626 (5th Cir. 1981) (same). See also supra note 10 (list of circuits holding
airports are public forums).
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Supreme Court decision in United States v. Kokinda,70 compelled its
holding that airport terminals are nonpublic forums.7 1 It is sub-
mitted that the majority in ISKCON v. Lee arrived at this conclu-
sion based on faulty analysis. Although the court acknowledged
that the physical characteristics of the airports resemble those of a
public forum, 72 it asserted that an analysis of the airport's purpose
compelled a different result.73
A. Misapplication of Physical Characteristic Analysis
As previously noted, the physical characteristics of property are
a factor to be considered when determining forum status.7 ' To
that end, the degree to which a location resembles a street is a
frequently examined factor. 8 For instance, in Kokinda, the entire
postal complex consisted of a free standing building, two side-
walks, a driveway and a parking lot.76 It did not lease any space to
stores or restaurants, nor were the building and sidewalk immedi-
ately adjacent to other commercial establishments. 77 The postal
complex did not resemble the common examples of traditional
public forums:78 main streets and public parks.
In contrast, the airport terminals house a variety of stores and
70 110 S. Ct. 3115 (1990).
71 See ISKCON v. Lee, 925 F.2d at 580 (prior to Kokinda, this panel was prepared to fol-
low authority established in other circuits).
72 See id. at 581. "[Rleliance on the visual and other similarities between the terminals'
passageways and a 'bustling metropolitan boulevard' was understandable." Id.
"a See id. at 580-81 (emphasis added).
" See Wolin v. Port of New York Auth., 392 F.2d 83, 89 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
940 (1968).
'5 See Comment, supra note 10, at 1081. See also Fernandes v. Limmer, 663 F.2d 619,
627 (5th Cir. 1981); Chicago Area Military Project v. City of Chicago, 508 F.2d 921, 925
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 992 (1975).
76 See United States v. Kokinda, 110 S. Ct. 3115, 3118 (1990).
17 See id. at 3120. "[Tlhe postal sidewalk was constructed solely to provide for the pas-
sage of individuals engaged in postal business." Id. The Court distinguished the sidewalk
from a public street which is "open ... [as] a necessary conduit in the daily affairs of...
citizens .... [and as] a place where people . . .[can] enjoy the open air . . . in a relaxed
environment." Id. (quoting Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc.,
452 U.S. 640, 651 (1981)). But see Fernandes, 663 F.2d at 627 ("existence of a leasehold by
a private party on public property does not remove from the realm of state action restric-
tions on the exercise of civil rights at the site").
78 See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 802
(1985) (streets and parks immemorially held for use of public); Hague v. Committee for
Indus. Org., 307U.S. 496, 515-16 (1939) (same). See also Public Forum Analysis After Perry,
supra note 8, at 547 (examples of street and park protection).
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restaurants, as well as an art exhibition area, bank and dental of-
fice. 9 The many commercial establishments, open passageways
and hoards of people present in the terminals mirror the scene of
a crowded downtown street; 80 air terminals are "streets of moder-
nity." Such an analysis reveals that the physical characteristics of
the post office and sidewalk, in Kokinda, are substantially different
from the physical characteristics of the airport terminals at issue
in ISKCON v. Lee.82 The additional commercial establishments,
which the post office does not harbor, render the airports more
analogous to a city street, long regarded to be a public forum,83
than to a postal facility.8
Geographic location of an area is another physical factor rele-
vant to public forum analysis.8" For example, the Kokinda plural-
ity, in holding that the post office was a nonpublic forum, pointed
to the physical location of the walkway as separating the parking
lot from the post office.86 The physical-geographic separation of
airports from residential and downtown areas, however, is due to
the noise emitted by airplanes.87 The physical isolation of airports
is not for the purpose of regulating public access88 and' therefore,
does not jeopardize its status as a public forum.8 9
"' See infra note 101 (list of facilities and stores available in airports).
" See Public Forum Analysis After Perry, supra note 8, at 557. See, e.g., Jamison v. City of
St. Louis, 828 F.2d 1280, 1283 (8th Cir. 1987) (airport terminal is like busy city street),
cert. denied, 485 U.S. 987 (1988); U.S. S.W. Africa/Namibia Trade and Cultural Council v.
United States, 708 F.2d 760, 764 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (airports similar to streets).
"' Public Forum Analysis After Perry, supra note 8, at 557.
82 See infra notes 83-84 and accompanying text (discussing public areas).
83 See, e.g., Fernandes v. Limmer, 663 F.2d 619, 627 (5th Cir. 1981) (areas where people
dine, shop, sightsee are public forums), cert. dismissed, 485 U.S. 1124 (1982).
84 See ISKCON v. Lee, 925 F.2d at 585 (discussion of similarities between airports and
streets);Jamison, 828 F.2d at 1283 (airport terminal like busy street with shops, restaurants,
newsstands). See also Wolin v. Port of New York Auth., 392 F.2d 83, 89 (2d Cir.) (interior
of bus terminal containing stores and concessions resembling small city was public fortim),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 940 (1968); supra note 80 and accompanying text (airport terminal
visually resembles street).
85 See supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text (discussing physical analysis to determine
forum status).
" See Kokinda, 110 S. Ct. at 3120.
87 See ISKCON v. Lee, 925 F.2d at 586 (Oakes, C.J., dissenting). See generally C. RHYNE,
AIRPORTS AND THE LAW, 48-54 (1979) (zoning restrictions on airports).
'a See ISKCON v. Lee, 925 F.2d at 586. "The isolation .. .is in deference to the physics
and audiophonics of aviation and not to ... [restrict] movement of people and ideas." Id.
" See id. (location becomes less important when it is for functional purposes and not to
regulate public access). The district court, in ISKCON v. Lee, noted that:
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The "openness" of an area, both in terms of accessibility and
spaciousness, is a further area to be addressed in public forum
analysis.9" Notably, public ownership, albeit a significant factor in
forum analysis, does not automatically "open" that property to
the public.9" However, in ISKCON v. Lee, the Port Authority
opened the airports to the public by a lack of restriction on en-
try.92 Being open and accessible to the public at all times as a place
for the expression of public issues,93 airports are similar to parks
and streets whose "open access [to] all members of the public is
integral to their function as central gathering places."94
Consideration of openness leads to the issue of congestion in
airports.9" Congestion in the terminals, resulting from their open-
ness and accessibility, although a growing problem, "cannot sup-
port the sweeping prohibition of free speech implicit in finding
that the airport is not a public forum." '96 Rather, it is submitted
[I]f... defendant means that geographical proximity to the surrounding community
is an essential component of public forum status, he is quite mistaken, for remote,
residential streets, removed from a city's nerve center, are no less deserving of such
status than Times Square itself. If on the other hand, defendant means that sur-
rounding community members must pass through the situs on a daily basis, he fails
to cite any authority for so sweeping a proposition.
ISKCON v. Lee, 721 F. Supp. at 572, 579 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), aff d in part, rev'd in part, 925
F.2d 576 (2d Cir. 1991).
'* See Public Forum Analysis After Perry, supra note 8, at 555 ("a public forum should be
relatively spacious to ensure both the physical and psychological comfort and convenience
of all users of the property").
"' See United States Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114,
129, cert. denied, 453 U.S. 917 (1981). See also Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104,
116-17 (1972) (public school not available for unlimited expressive activity); Chicago Area
Military Project v. City of Chicago, 508 F.2d 921, 925 (7th Cir.) ("not all publically owned
facilities are available for every expression of free speech"), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 992
(1975); International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Wolke, 453 F. Supp. 869,
873 (E.D. Wis. 1978) ("mere fact of public ownership does not by itself require-that a
building be available as a public forum").
" Cf Fernandes v. Limmer, 663 F.2d 619, 627 (5th Cir. 1981) ("lack of restrictions on
public access to the commercial establishments located along . . . passageways").
" See ISKCON v. Lee, 925 F.2d at 585 (Oakes, C.J., dissenting) (airports have "invited
and welcomed extensive expressive activity within [their] . . . terminals").
"' United States v. Kokinda, 110 S. Ct. 3115, 3128 (1990).
91 See ISKCON v. Lee, 925 F.2d at 586 (Oakes, C.J., dissenting) (congestion problems,
which Port Authority asserts removed airport terminals from traditional forum status, are
no different from traffic on public streets).
" Fernandes, 663 F.2d at 626. The crowded passageways do not make the airport a non-
public forum. Id. "Rather, such ... go[es] to the reasonableness of the time, place, and
manner restrictions imposed on persons exercising First Amendment rights in the forum."
Id. See also Wolin v. Port of New York Auth., 392 F.2d 83, 90 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393
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that the congestion problem in airports is consistent with a finding
that the airport is a traditional public forum since the crowds and
unrest provide an atmosphere for free expression.9 7 Additionally,
the open areas in airport terminals are sufficiently spacious to al-
low the public to avoid any undesired intrusion.
8
B. Misapplication of United States v. Kokinda's Purpose Analysis
The majority stated that airports exist for the single purpose of
facilitating air travel," and thus, like the post office sidewalk,
which existed solely to facilitate the postal business, was unrelated
to protected expression.'00 It is submitted that such a determina-
tion overlooks the multitude of purposes served by the airports.
Although the primary activity of such a facility is air travel, it is by
no means the exclusive purpose.' 0 ' For example, the lobby of the
International Arrivals Building at Kennedy Airport includes an
area for the display of art exhibits, which any interested member
U.S. 940 (1968).
'" See ISKCON v. Lee, 925 F.2d at 586 (Oakes, CJ., dissenting). "The airport terminals
are 'an appropriate place for expressing one's view precisely because the primary activity
for which [they are] designed is attended with noisy crowds . . . some unrest and less than
perfect order.' " Id. (quoting Wolin, 392 F.2d at 90). The three airports together form one
of the busiest airport complexes in the world, having served almost 79 million travelers in
1986. See id. at 578.
98 Compare Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 307 (1973) (Douglas, J.,
concurring) (crowded confines of bus inappropriate for political ads forced on captive audi-
ence) with U.S. S.W. Africa/Namibia Trade and Cultural Council v. United States, 708
F.2d 760, 767 (D.C. Cir. 1983) ("The captive audience concerns of the Lehman Court...
are obviously lessened in the open parts of airport terminals . . ."). See also Consolidated
Edson v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 542 (1980) (customer may escape objection-
able bill insert by disposing of it); Erznozik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 209-10
n.5 (1975) (intrusion on privacy greater in bus than on street); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U;S.
77, 87-88 (1949) (persons unable to escape interference with privacy by loud broadcast
message).
" See ISKCON v. Lee, 925 F.2d at 581. Air terminals "are intended solely to facilitate a
particular type of transaction-air travel." Id.
100 See id. at 581. "Persons using the passageways in terminals are not there primarily to
meet a friend for lunch, window shop . .. or engage in any . . . other . . . purposes for
which typical downtown streets are used." Id.
101 See id. at 578. The airports house numerous shops and facilities in addition to facili-
tating air travel. At Kennedy's terminal building one can find numerous restaurants, bars,
and snack stands, a postal substation and postal facility, banks, telegraph offices, duty free
boutiques, a drug store, a nursery, barber shop, currency exchange facilities, a dental of-
fice, an area for the display of art exhibits, travel insurance facilities, cookie and candy
shops, a travellers check machine, an India store and a Bloomingdales boutique. Id.
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of the general public could view. 11 2 The terminals also contain
several currency exchanges, 03 as well as, in the Kennedy Airport
Lobby, a dental office."" Local residents wishing to be treated by
the dentist practicing at the airport would be required to visit the
airport for their dental needs. Any person requiring these services
may utilize the facilities regardless of whether that person is utiliz-
ing air travel facilities." 5
In addition, it is suggested that the airport complexes employ
hundreds of workers who may spend time casually strolling
through the terminal, browsing in shops, dining or viewing the
current art exhibit; these workers use the terminals as they would
a "main street" and not for an air-travel related purpose. Because
of the wide variety of services offered in the airports, it is submit-
ted that the airport terminals should not have been subjected to
the "sole purpose analysis" applied by the ISKCON court.
IV. APPLICATION OF FORUM ANALYSIS
In determining that an airport is a nonpublic forum, ISKCON v.
Lee relied on the Supreme Court's decision in United States v.
Kokinda.0 6 In Kokinda, however, no clear majority agreed on the
public forum question."0 Therefore, it is submitted, the court in
ISKCON v. Lee was not compelled to deem the airport a nonpublic
forum. Rather, it is suggested that the court ought to have desig-
102 See id. at 578.
103 See id. at 578.
'04 See ISKCON v. Lee, 925 F.2d at 578.
100 See Chicago Area Military Project v. City of Chicago, 508 F.2d 921, 925 (7th Cir.)
(many people enter airport terminals for reasons unconnected to travel), cert. denied, 421
U.S. 992 (1975); Comment, supra note 10, at 1081-82 ("Any member of the public may
enter an airport terminal whether he or she plans to board an airplane or not.").
100 See ISKCON v. Lee, 925 F.2d at 580. "We believe, however, that Kokinda has altered
public forum analysis and that we would not be faithful to Supreme Court precedent if we
were to follow the other circuits [holding an airport to be a public forum]."'Id.
107 See United States v. Kokinda, 110 S. Ct. 3115 (1990). The plurality opinion by justice
O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice White and Justice Scalia, maintained
that the postal sidewalks were nonpublic forums. See id. at 3119-20. Justice Kennedy, al-
though concurring in the judgment, determined that "[iut is not necessary, however, to
make a precise determination whether this sidewalk and others like it are public or non-
public forums." Id. at 3125 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice Brennan, dissenting along
with Justice Marshall, Justice Stevens and Justice Blackmun, asserted that "the postal side-
walk is a public forum, either of the 'traditional' or 'limited-purpose' variety." Id. at 3133
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
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nated the airport a public forum and scrutinized the regulation
under the more stringent standard of review applicable to restric-
tions on speech in public forums - narrowly tailored to serve a
significant governmental interest, leaving open alternative chan-
nels of communication. It is further suggested that the portion of
the airport regulation at issue in ISKCON v. Lee, which prohibited
the solicitation of funds in the airport, withstands constitutional
scrutiny under this more stringent standard of review, and, there-
fore, it was unnecessary for the court to conduct a forum analysis.
The airport regulation merely prohibits the solicitation of funds
in a "continuous or repetitive manner." ' The requirement that
a time, place and manner restriction on speech in a public forum
be narrowly tailored, does not oblige the state to use the least re-
strictive means to realize its objective. 0 9 Rather, the state must
not implement a restriction which is substantially broader than
necessary to effectuate its purpose.1 0 The airport regulation com-
plies with this mandate since it prohibits only that conduct which
interferes with the airport's effective operation - the continuous
or repetitive solicitation of funds.'
Moreover, the airport regulation serves the significant govern-
mental interest of facilitating air travel and protecting airport pa-
trons from the agitation and disturbance caused by in-person so-
See ISKCON v. Lee, 925 F.2d at 578-79. "The following conduct is prohibited within
the interior areas of buildings or structures at an air terminal if conducted by a person to
or with passers-by in a continuous or repetitive manner: ... (c) The solicitation and receipt
of funds." Id.
'" See Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 782 (1989) ("less-restrictive-alterna-
tive" analysis is rejected as part of constitutionality of time, place and manner restriction).
See also United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689 (1985) (bar letter regulation not
"invalid simply because there is some imaginable alternative that might be less burdensome
on speech"); Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 657 (1984) ("less-restrictive alternative
analysis ...has never been a part of the inquiry into the validity of a time, place,'and
manner regulation"); Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 297
(1984) ("if the parks would be more exposed to harm without the sleeping prohibition than
with it, the ban is safe from invalidation under the First Amendment"). But see Boos v.
Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 329 (1988) (content-based restriction is not narrowly tailored if less
restrictive alternative is readily available); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267,
280 n.6 (1986) (under strict scrutiny court may consider "whether lawful alternative and
less restrictive means could have been used").
11 See Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. at 799; see also Frisby v: Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 485
(1988) ("a complete ban can be narrowly tailored but only if each activity within the pro-
scription's scope is an appropriately targeted evil").
"' See supra note 108.
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licitation of money."' Additionally, since only "continuous or
repetitive" solicitation of money is forbidden, alternative channels
of communication, such as the distribution of literature, are still
available to the public.11 3
The ISKCON court was not explicit as to which standard of re-
view it was applying. Although it characterized the airport termi-
nals as nonpublic forums, its analysis included an examination of
the second prong of traditional public forum analysis: significant
governmental interests served by the regulation."1 4 It is submitted
that the court's examination of "significant governmental inter-
ests" was inconsistent with its designation of the airport as a non-
public forum. Instead, the time, place and manner regulation at
issue in the case should have been reviewed solely to determine
whether the restriction was reasonable and whether it substan-
tially interfered with communication.115 Finally, a better alterna-
tive was to classify the airports as public forums and uphold the
regulation under the stricter standard of review.
CONCLUSION
Forum status can be determined only after careful examination
112 See ISKCON v. Lee, 925 F.2d at 581. "Just as the Postal Authority in Kokinda had a
significant interest in protecting users of the branch office from the in-person solicitation
of funds, the Port Authority has an interest in protecting its airport patrons from the iden-
tical disruption of in-person solicitation." Id. Cf Kokinda, 110 S. Ct. at 3126 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) ("the Government here has a significant interest in protecting the integrity of
the purposes to which it has dedicated the property, that is, facilitating its customers' postal
transactions").
Il Cf. Kokinda, I 10 S. Ct. at 3126. Justice Kennedy, in his concurring opinion, noted
that the postal regulation provided for alternative channels of communication because it
only banned in-person solicitations. Id.
The regulation, in its only part challenged here, goes no further than to prohibit
personal solicitations on postal property for the immediate payment of money. The
regulation, as the United States concedes, expressly permits the respondents and all
others to engage in political speech on topics of their choice and to distribute litera-
ture soliciting support . ...
Id. See also United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 180-81 (1983) (invalidating ban on picket-
ing only on sidewalks surrounding court building); Linmark Assocs. Inc. v. Willingboro,
431 U.S. 85, 93 (1977) (ban on 'For Sale' signs does not leave sellers with realistic alterna-
tive channels of communication); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 120 (1972)
(antinoise ordinance leaves open alternative channels of communication).
.14 See ISKCON v. Lee, 925 F.2d at 581.
"' See supra notes 47-49 and accompanying text (different standards of review for differ-
ent types of forums).
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of a forum's physical characteristics and purpose. The majority in
ISKCON v. Lee failed to engage in this two-part forum analysis,
relying, instead, solely upon the Supreme Court's decision in
Kokinda to determine that airports are nonpublic forums. It is sug-
gested that a detailed scrutiny of the physical characteristics and
purposes of the airports would have lead to the conclusion that
airports are public forums. Accordingly, a more demanding stan-
dard of review would be applied to time, place and manner re-
strictions on speech in those areas. The regulation at issue in ISK-
CON v. Lee could have withstood such scrutiny, and, therefore, it
was wholly unnecessary to make a precedent-setting determination
as to the forum status of public airports.
The designation of a particular forum should not be ascertained
hastily. In order to safeguard the fundamental right of access to
public places for the exercise of first amendment privileges, courts
should carefully examine the site of a speech-inhibiting regulation
before labeling it a nonpublic forum. Such a determination not
only increases the government's ability to restrain free speech in
the area, but it will have a significant impact on the public's right
to express themselves in that place in the future.
Jennifer A. Giaimo & Stacy Plotz Maza
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